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Recent Developments

Dupree v. State:
The Prosecution May Not Impeach a Defendant with Evidence of the Defendant's
Silence Following Advisement of Miranda Rights
By Anne Bodnar
n a unanimous decision, the
Court ofAppeals ofMaryland
held that a trial court may not admit
testimony that a defendant was
advised of his Miranda rights and
thereafter remained silent for purposes
of impeachment. Dupree v. State,
352 Md. 314,722 A.2d 52 (1998).
In so holding, the court preserved the
right of a defendant to remain silent
without evidence of this fact being
used against him.
This case arose from an incident
on May 3, 1996, when Sean Dupree
("Dupree") shot and killed a man
following a briefconfrontation on the
street. Id. at 316, 722 A.2d at 53.
Dupree was arrested and charged in
connection with the incident. Id at
321, 722A.2dat55. Upon his arrest,
Dupree chose to remain silent after he
was advised ofhis Miranda rights. Id
at 322, 722 A.2d at 55.
In the Circuit Court for
Baltimore City, Dupree was found
guilty of second degree murder and
use of a handgun in the commission
of a crime of violence. At Dupree's
trial, the court allowed the
prosecution, for the purpose of
impeachment, to introduce testimony
that Dupree was advised of his
Miranda rights. Id at 321, 722 A.2d
at 55. Dupree appealed the decision
to the Court of Special Appeals of
Maryland, which affirmed the
conviction. Id Dupree petitioned the

I

Court ofAppeals ofMaryland, which
granted certiorari. Id. at 316, 722
A.2d at 53. Dupree contended that
the prosecution's offered testimony
violated both Maryland evidentiary
rules and his constitutional rights,
stressing thatthe testimony allowed the
jury to infer impermissibly an
admission of guilt. Id. at 322, 722
A.2d at 55.
In addressing the issue of
whether the trial judge erred in
admitting this evidence, the court first
reviewed State v. Raithel, in which a
similar issue was decided twenty
years ago. Id at 323, 722 A.2d at
56 (citing State v. Raithel, 285 Md.
478, 404 A.2d 264 (1979)). In
Raithel, the court of special appeals
held that the "privilege against selfincrimination prevents an accused's
silence ~t a prior hearing from being
considered in assessing his credibility,"
a ruling the court of appeals affinned
on appeal without having to reach the
constitutional issue. Id (citing Raithel
at 478,404 A.2d at 267).
The court observed that the initial
consideration in admitting the evidence
in the instant case was whether the
evidence was proper under the
applicable state law. Id. Under the
Maryland Rules of Evidence 5-401
and 5-402, the trial court may not
admit evidence of any fact that is not
relevant to the determination of guilt
or innocence in a criminal trial. Id. at

323-34, 722 A.2d at 56 (citing MD.
R. EVID. 5-401 and 5-402). The
court noted that, although the trial
judge has the ultimate discretion under
the rules to review and admit
evidence, the judge may not abuse
that discretion. Id. at 324,722 A.2d
at 56 (citing Merzbacher v. State,
346 Md. 391,404,697 A.2d 432,
439 (1997)). The court concluded
that the judge in Dupree abused his/
her discretion by admitting evidence
that was not relevant to any issue in
the case. Id at 332, 722 A.2d at
61.

The court reasoned that,
because Dupree's silence was not
material to any fact at issue in the
case, testimony that he was advised
ofhis rights was inadmissable. Id at
332, 722 A.2d at 61. Such
testimony, the court speculated,
allowed the prosecution to indirectly
suggest to the jury that the defendant
chose to remain silent because he had
something to hide. Id. at 322, 722
A.2d at 55. In so surmising, the court
determined that the resulting
prejudice of admitting evidence of a
defendant's advisement of Miranda
rights at trial, when the defendant
gave no subsequent statement,
outweighed any probative value such
testimony could offer. Id at 330,722
A.2d at 60. Notwithstanding this
conclusion, the court found it helpful
to address the constitutional question
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in order to clarify the circumstances
under which the trial court may admit
testimony ofa defendant's post-arrest
silence for the purpose of
impeachment. Id. at 324-30, 722
A.2d at 57-59.
The court considered the general
rule that the State may not violate a
defendant's right to due process by
introducing evidence ofa defendant's
post-arrest silence for the purpose of
impeachment, based on the inherent
unfairness presented in penalizing an
individual for invoking a guaranteed
right. Id. at 324, 722 A.2d at 57
(citing Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610
(l976)). The court reviewed past
cases in which Doyle violations were
found in order to assess the
appropriate circumstances for
allowing such testimony. Id. at 32430, 722 A.2d at 57-59. In the instant
case, Dupree posited that the
prosecution's mere mention that the
defendant was advised ofhis Miranda
rights, where no subsequent statement
was made, was a violation of the
Doyle rule. Id. at 325, 722 A.2d at
57.
Courts in the past have held that
testimony that the police read the
Miranda rights to a defendant upon
arrest may be admitted to establish the
voluntariness of the defendant's
statement given thereafter. Id. at 32526, 722 A.2d at 57 (citing United
States v. De La Luz Gal/egos, 738
F.2d 378, 381-82 (lOth Cir. 1984)).
In cases where the defendant made
no subsequent statement, however,
the prosecution may not use testimony
to that effect to impeach the
defendant. Id. at 330, 722 A.2d at
60. Such testimony, according to the
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court, allows the jury to improperly
inferthedefendant'sguilt. Id at331,
722 A.2d at 60 (citing Zemo v. State,
101 Md. App. 303,646 A.2d 1050
(1994)). This rule, in line with Doy/e,
serves to protect a defendant's right
to remain silent without fear that the
silence will be used against the
defendant at trial. Id. at 330, 722
A.2d at 59.
Finally, the court addressed the
issue ofwhether this error was hann:ful
to the extent that a reversal was
warranted. Id. at 332-33, 722 A.2d
at 61-62. The standard of review
employed by the court in detennining
whether the error was harmless was
whether the evidence bore on the
ultimate verdict beyond a reasonable
doubt. Id. at 332, 722 A.2d at 61.
The court found that, because Dupree
was asserting a case of self-defense,
the prosecution's use of his silence
was a deliberate attempt to undermine
his credibility. Id. at 333,722 A.2d
at 61. Because Dupree's credibility
was critical to his defense, the court
ruled that the error committed was
clearly harmful. Id
In Dupree v. State, the court
ruled that the risk of prejudice that
would result from the admission of
such evidence posed an impermissible
harm to a defendant's right to due
process. By so holding, the court
preserved the defendant's right to
remain silent without fear that the
prosecution could use this silence to
circumvent their heavy burden of
proof This ruling effectively prevents
the jury from basing their detennination
of guilt or innocence on extraneous
inferences ofguilt and shifts the proper
focus to the merits of the case.
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